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This paper aims to evaluate the relationship between capital and liquidity following the 
implementation of the Basel III rules. These regulatory measures target both increased capital 
ratios and a reduction of banks’ maturity transformation risk, which could result in excessive 
constraints on bank liquidity creation, thereby negatively affecting economic growth. Using a 
simultaneous equation model, we find a bi-causal negative relationship, which suggests that 
banks may reduce liquidity creation as capital increases; and when liquidity creation 
increases, banks reduce capital ratios. Our results therefore imply a trade-off between 
financial stability (higher capital, reduced risk) and economic growth (liquidity creation). 
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LIQUIDITY CREATION AND BANK CAPITAL  
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we study the relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital in 
the context of the new regulatory requirements introduced by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision under the Basel III framework. Liquidity creation is one of the key 
functions of banks. Traditionally, banks create liquidity by financing relatively illiquid assets 
(for example, loans) with relatively liquid liabilities (such as deposits). By doing so, banks 
provide households with insurance against idiosyncratic consumption and depositors with on 
demand liquidity (Bryant 1980; Diamond and Dybvig 1983). In addition, banks create 
liquidity off the balance sheet through loan commitments and similar claims to liquid funds 
(Holmstrom and Tirole 1998; Kashyap et al. 2002). 
Liquidity creation allows banks to enhance the flow of credit to the economy (Diamond 
and Rajan 2001). Recent evidence finds that bank liquidity creation is positively related to 
real economic output (Berger and Sedunov, 2017). However, high values of liquidity creation 
also expose banks to maturity transformation risk. Since maturity transformation (that is, 
funding longer-term loans or asset purchases with shorter-term deposits or debt obligations) is 
one of banks’ key business areas, they are particularly exposed to funding liquidity risk. 
Indeed, the 2007-2008 global financial crisis revealed critical shortcomings in banks’ 
management of funding liquidity risk, with significant consequences for system-wide 
financial stability.  
In response to the severity of the financial crisis, the Basel Committee issued a new 
international regulatory framework for banks, known as Basel III, which proposed both 
enhanced capital standards and introduced liquidity regulation. In the new framework, banks 
are required to meet two quantitative liquidity ratios: the liquidity coverage ratio and the net 
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stable funding ratio.1 While the former aims to promote short-term resilience, the latter aims 
to limit overreliance on short-term wholesale funding, to encourage better assessment of 
funding risk across all on- and off-balance sheet items, and to promote funding stability. In 
other words, the introduction of the net stable funding ratio aims to reduce banks’ maturity 
transformation risk.  
In addition, the Basel III framework has proposed enhanced rules for both the quantity 
and the quality of bank capital.2 Recent evidence indicates that liquidity creation and bank 
capital are closely interrelated. The literature suggests a complex relationship between 
liquidity creation and bank capital, whereby capital can either enhance or hamper bank 
liquidity creation. Berger and Bouwman (2009) summarize this debate into two main 
hypotheses: the “financial fragility-crowding out hypothesis” and the “risk absorption 
hypothesis”. The former posits a negative relationship and suggests that higher capital reduces 
liquidity creation. Conversely, the latter predicts a positive relationship and suggests that 
higher capital increases liquidity creation. As a result, recent regulatory measures aimed both 
at enhancing capital ratios and reducing maturity transformation risk could result in excessive 
constraints on bank liquidity creation, thereby decreasing their ability to channel funds to the 
economy and therefore negatively affect economic growth. Indeed, one of the main arguments 
against the introduction of the net stable funding ratio is that it may be too restrictive and 
undermine banks´ traditional role in liquidity creation and maturity transformation and could 
																																																								
1 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2010, 2013, 2014) for more details on the changes to 
capital requirements and the definitions of the liquidity ratios as well as the implementation timetable. 
2 Total regulatory capital now comprises the sum of the following elements: (i) Tier 1 capital (going-concern 
capital), that includes common equity Tier 1 (CET1) and additional Tier 1, and (2) Tier 2 capital (gone-concern 
capital). The CET1 capital must be at least 4.5% of risk-weighted assets (RWA) whereas Tier 1 capital must be 
at least 6% of RWA. Total capital (Tier 1 capital plus Tier 2 capital) must be at least 8.0% of RWA at all times. 
Moreover, Basel III establishes a capital conservation buffer comprised of CET1 that implies that banks, at least 
in normal times, should operate with a “minimum” capital of 10.5% of their total RWA. In addition, national 
authorities may require a countercyclical buffer. Finally, the Committee also agreed to introduce a simple, 
transparent, non-risk based leverage ratio, which is calibrated to act as a credible supplementary measure to the 
risk-based capital requirements.  
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lead to a shortage of long-term lending with negative consequences for economic growth 
(Gobat et al. 2014). 
Against this background, this paper aims to empirically analyze the relationship 
between liquidity creation (or alternatively, illiquidity) and capital by considering an indicator 
related to the new liquidity requirements of Basel III (the inverse of the net stable funding 
ratio). Higher values of this metric indicate that the amount of illiquid assets in a bank’s 
balance sheet is increasing in relation to the available amount of stable funding, therefore 
indicating higher liquidity creation (and correspondently higher maturity transformation). As 
liquidity creation and bank capital might be jointly determined (Distinguin et al. 2013; 
Horvath et al. 2014; Fu et al. 2016), we employ a simultaneous equations model to capture the 
relationship between capital and liquidity. As a laboratory for this analysis, we focus on the 
Eurozone, as an interesting case study.3 The Eurozone, one of the largest economic regions in 
the world, was badly hit by the 2010-2011 sovereign debt crisis (also known as the Eurozone 
crisis). Concerns were raised that the new capital and liquidity regulation impacted on the 
post-crisis recovery, via a decrease in liquidity creation. We believe this particular setting 
makes the analysis of the relationship between capital and liquidity even more interesting. 
Our sample period starts in 1999, the year a number of countries in the European Union (EU) 
adopted the euro as their national currency. The creation of the monetary union resulted in 
Eurozone countries becoming increasingly integrated and set apart from other parts of the 
European Union by their economic management – in particular, monetary and economic 
policy-making. In addition, the Eurozone is currently undergoing a profound process of 
transformation, which started in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and gained 
																																																								
3 The Eurozone is a geographic and economic region which consists of all the European Union (EU) countries 
that have adopted the euro as their national currency. As per 2018, it is a monetary union of 19 of the 28 
European Union member states. The original 11 eurozone countries are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Greece joined in 2001. Since then, 
Cyprus (2008), Estonia (2011); Latvia (2014); Lithuania (2015); Malta (2008); Slovakia (2009) and Slovenia 
(2007) also joined the monetary union.	
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momentum as regulators tried to tackle the problems of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010–
2011. In 2012, this resulted in the Banking Union, which aims to deliver an integrated 
financial safety net for the Eurozone. Through common supervision of banks, the Banking 
Union aims to ensure effective enforcement of stronger prudential requirements for banks, in 
particular by requiring them to keep sufficient capital reserves and liquidity. The EU Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD IV) incorporates the Basel III proposals of the BCBS and 
introduces a number of important changes to the European banking regulatory framework 
(e.g., a new systemic risk buffer).4 Importantly, while the Basel III requirements apply only to 
“internationally active banks”, the CRD IV regulations apply to all banks and investment 
firms. For this reason, and unlike previous studies that focus only on listed banks (e.g., 
Distinguin et al. 2013), our sample includes commercial, savings and cooperative banks, 
which gives us a more representative picture of the Eurozone banking sector, as unlisted 
banks account for the majority of banks in this area (Köhler 2015). This also allows us to 
exploit the heterogeneity of bank size and ownership across countries and to investigate the 
impact that the new CRD IV rules could exert on the economic recovery of the Eurozone.  
Our results show a negative relationship between capital ratios and our liquidity 
creation proxy, suggesting that banks may reduce liquidity creation as bank capital increases, 
thus providing evidence in support of the “financial fragility-crowding out hypothesis”. This 
result holds both for small and large banks, indicating that size is not a determinant of the 
negative relationship. Interestingly, when we divide the sample by ownership, we find that the 
result does not hold for savings banks, which appear to increase their liquidity creation when 
their capital increases. For these types of banks, the “risk absorption” capacity of equity 
capital is an important driver to explain liquidity creation. Moreover, we report that savings 
banks strengthen their capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity. This could be explained 																																																								
4 See Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the 
activities of credit institutions and prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms. 
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by the different ability of savings banks to raise external finance and their higher reliance on 
retained earnings. Finally, we find that the overall negative relationship between capital and 
liquidity creation is stronger during the crisis period (2008-2013), thereby suggesting that 
while the new regulatory ratios might have improved bank stability by increasing capital and 
decreasing maturity mismatch, they might also have contributed to the weak economic 
performance of the Eurozone, whose banks have reduced liquidity creation. 
Our analysis contributes to the literature along different dimensions. First, we contribute 
to the strand of literature on liquidity creation and the impact of the new Basel III rules by 
using the inverse of the net stable funding ratio as an indicator of liquidity creation and 
providing evidence for Eurozone banks. Second, we contribute to the literature investigating 
the relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital. We extend the work of 
Distinguin et al. (2013) by including both listed and unlisted banks. Finally, we contribute to 
a recent strand of the literature focusing on the importance of bank liquidity creation for real 
economic output (Berger and Sedunov 2017) and for bank stability and financial crises 
(Berger and Bouwman 2017). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
literature and develops our main hypotheses on the relationship between bank capital and 
liquidity creation. Section 3 describes the data and methodology employed in the empirical 
analysis and defines the explanatory variables. Section 4 presents and discusses the results 
obtained. Section 5 summarizes the results and presents our conclusions. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Literature Review 
Traditionally, the literature has focused on the role of banks as risk transformers and 
less so on their role as liquidity creators (e.g., Diamond 1984; Boyd and Prescott 1986). Some 
notable exceptions include the works of Kashyap et al. (2002), Gatev and Strahan (2006) and 
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Pennachi (2006). According to Kashyap et al. (2002), banks combine liquidity provision to 
both depositors and borrowers to reduce risk, as long as liquidity demands from these two 
classes of customers are not highly correlated. The reason for this combination is to diversify 
away some liquidity risk and thus reduce the need to hold cash. Gatev et al. (2006) extend the 
work of Kashyap et al (2002) to increase the understanding of the deposit-lending liquidity 
synergy by testing how bank equity risk and the supply of deposit funds reacted to the 
liquidity crisis of 1998. Their results suggest that this diversification effect becomes 
particularly powerful during periods of crisis, when the correlation in demand for liquidity by 
depositors and by borrowers becomes negative. Pennachi (2006) contributes to this literature 
by showing that banks’ ability to specialize in liquidity provision appears to be linked to the 
federal safety net provided by deposit insurance. Other studies focus on specific components 
of liquidity creation, usually business lending or real estate lending (e.g., Berger and Udell 
1994; Peek and Rosengren 1995). 
Empirical papers analyzing the relationship between capital and liquidity creation 
remain scarce. Recent developments in this literature have followed the pioneering work by 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) and the establishment of new capital and liquidity requirements 
(in particular, the net stable funding ratio) in Basel III (BCBS 2010). Berger and Bouwman 
(2009) construct four measures of liquidity creation (based either on loan category –“cat”- or 
solely on maturity –“mat”- and alternatively including off-balance sheet activities –“fat”- or 
excluding them –“nonfat”). They apply them to a sample of US banks from 1993 to 2003 and 
show that the effect of capital on liquidity creation is positive for large banks and negative for 
small banks. Therefore, the findings by Berger and Bouwman (2009) suggest that the higher 
capital requirements established by regulators in the Basel III accord may increase the 
liquidity created by large banks but reduce the liquidity created by small banks. Distinguin et 
al. (2013) use a simultaneous equations framework to investigate the relationship between 
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bank regulatory capital and bank liquidity measured from on-balance sheet positions for 
European and US listed commercial banks over the period 2000-2006. They find that liquidity 
creation and bank capital are closely interrelated: higher capital ratios imply lower liquidity 
creation, as banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they create more liquidity. 
Horvath et al. (2014) perform Granger-causality tests in a dynamic GMM panel estimator 
framework on a data set of Czech banks, which mainly includes small banks from 2000 to 
2010. Similar to Distinguin et al. (2013), they show that capital negatively affects liquidity 
creation. They also report that higher liquidity creation causes a reduction in bank capital. 
Finally, Fu et al. (2016) analyze the relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital 
for a sample of commercial banks in 14 Asia-Pacific countries from 2005 to 2012. Their 
empirical results are similar to those obtained by Distinguin et al. (2013) and Horvath et al. 
(2014), reporting a negative and significant bi-causal relationship between liquidity creation 
and regulatory capital.	 Fungáčová et al. (2017) examine how the introduction of deposit 
insurance influences the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation in an 
emerging market. They conclude that the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme in Russia 
has different effects on the relationship between capital and bank liquidity creation across 
different types of banks, the banks characterized by relatively high household deposit ratios 
being the most affected. For these banks, deposit insurance reduces the impact of capital on 
liquidity creation. 
More recently, some studies focus on the importance of bank liquidity creation in the 
economy and in predicting financial crises. Berger and Sedunov (2017) find that bank 
liquidity creation is positively related to real economic output, confirming that on- and off-
balance sheet liquidity creation have positive effects on the economy. In the same vein, 
Berger and Bouwman (2017) examine the interplay among bank liquidity creation, monetary 
policy and financial crises. They conclude that high liquidity creation (relative to trend) helps 
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predict crises, controlling for other factors, thus suggesting that authorities should monitor 
bank liquidity creation closely to predict and perhaps lessen the likelihood of financial crises. 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
In their seminal paper, Berger and Bouwman (2009) discuss two opposing hypotheses 
on the link between capital and liquidity creation: the “financial fragility-crowding out” 
hypothesis and the “risk absorption” hypothesis. The former predicts that higher capital 
reduces liquidity creation; the latter states that higher capital enhances the ability of banks to 
create liquidity.  
Accordingly, we derive the following testable hypotheses: 
H1: Higher capital reduces liquidity creation. 
H2: Higher capital increases liquidity creation. 
The “financial fragility-crowding out” view is based on previous works by Diamond 
and Rajan (2000, 2001) and Gorton and Winton (2000). Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) 
present a model where the bank's asset side and liability side are tied together. They consider 
a lender that raises funds from depositors to provide financing to an entrepreneur. Because 
loans are illiquid, lenders may demand a premium for illiquidity or even may want to 
liquidate early if they need funds before the loan matures. Nevertheless, the adverse 
consequences of illiquidity can be avoided if the relationship lender is a bank that borrows 
using demand deposits. Depositors enable banks to borrow against the full value of the 
illiquid loan they hold, and they also help to mitigate the costs of illiquidity, as depositors 
could precipitate a ‘run’ if the bank threatens to withhold efforts.5 Therefore, fragility 
commits banks to create liquidity, whereas stabilization policies, such as capital requirements, 
may reduce liquidity creation. The Gorton and Winton (2000) model shows that an increase in 																																																								
5 Note that a deposit insurance system can limit the negative effect of capital on liquidity creation, as suggested 
by Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001). 
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required bank capital forces investors to reduce their deposit holdings in favor of equity. 
Because deposits are liquid and bank equity is illiquid, changing deposits for capital may 
reduce liquidity creation. This “crowding out” effect is more likely to affect small banks, as in 
larger capital markets, an increase in capital may cause investors to shift to equities other than 
bank deposits (Berger and Bouwman 2009).  
In summary, the “financial fragility-crowding out” theory states that higher capital 
reduces liquidity creation. Conversely, the “risk absorption” theory states that higher capital 
increases liquidity creation. Liquidity creation may increase bank losses, as it implies having 
more illiquid assets to meet the liquidity demands of customers (Allen and Gale 2004). 
Therefore, because capital may help banks to absorb greater risk (see, e.g., Coval and Thakor 
2005; Repullo 2004; Von Thadden 2004), some authors (e.g., Berger and Bouwman 2009) 
infer that higher capital may allow banks to create more liquidity. The risk absorption 
hypothesis may apply more strongly to large banks as they are usually exposed to more 
intense regulatory scrutiny and greater market discipline (Berger and Bouwman 2009).  
Recent literature also suggests a causal relationship that moves from liquidity creation 
to capital. Again, two opposing hypotheses are proposed. Horvath et al. (2014) analyze the 
relationship between liquidity creation and capital by examining empirical works regarding 
the impact of risk on banks’ capital buffers (Jokipii and Milne 2011; Lindquist 2004). 
According to the so-called “liquidity risk” hypothesis, as greater liquidity creation increases 
the risk of illiquidity for banks, banks should strengthen their solvency because capital acts as 
a buffer against unexpected withdrawals from customers. Therefore, this hypothesis would 
imply a positive relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital. Nonetheless, the 
“liquidity substitution” hypothesis proposed by Distinguin et al. (2013) suggests a negative 
relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital. When banks face higher illiquidity, 
they may consider certain liquid liabilities as stable funding sources and thus substituting 
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capital with these ‘stable’ liabilities. The latter means that banks may not strengthen their 
capital when they face illiquidity, as defined in the new Basel rules. 
We therefore derive the following testable hypotheses: 
H3: Higher liquidity creation induces banks to increase capital.  
H4: Higher liquidity creation induces banks to decrease capital. 
We test the abovementioned hypotheses by implementing a simultaneous equations 
model to account for the fact that capital and liquidity creation may be jointly determined. 
3. Sample and methodological aspects 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample comprises 1,367 commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks 
operating in 17 Eurozone countries over the period 1999–2013, for a total of 7,275 bank/year 
observations. Data are from the Bankscope database maintained by Bureau Van Dijk (now 
Orbis Bank Focus). For the reasons discussed above, we focus on Eurozone countries.6 While 
some choices are driven by data availability (the estimation of the net stable funding ratio is 
data intensive), we use unconsolidated financial statements.7 This allows us to treat foreign 
subsidiaries as separate credit institutions, thereby reducing the possibility of introducing 
aggregation bias in the results (Delis and Staikouras 2011).  
Merged banks are considered separate entities before the merger and single entities 
afterward. All the ratios capturing bank-specific characteristics are calculated based on the 
standardized global accounting format. Those entities that present abnormal ratios or extreme 
values are eliminated from the sample as outliers to ensure that the analysis is not affected by 																																																								
6 We restrict the analysis to countries that adopted the euro during the sample period (firm-year observations are 
included only if the country is a Eurozone member in that specific year). We thus exclude the cases of Latvia 
(joined in 2014) and Lithuania (joined in 2015). 
7 If unconsolidated financial statements were unavailable (this is sometimes the case for small-size banks, which 
only report on a consolidated basis as the number of subsidiaries is small to warrant separate audited statements), 
then consolidated data were used to avoid dropping the banks from the sample. 
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potential measurement errors and misreporting.8 After completing this filtering, we obtain a 
final dataset consisting of an unbalanced panel with 7,275 observations. In contrast to other 
studies that examine only listed banks (Distinguin et al. 2013), most banks in our sample are 
unlisted (approximately 94 percent), which gives us a more representative picture of the 
Eurozone banking sector as unlisted banks account for the majority of banks (Baselga-Pascual 
et al. 2015; Köhler 2015). Table 1 shows the number of banks and observations in the sample 
by country.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
3.2. Methodology 
As liquidity creation and bank capital might be jointly determined (Distinguin et al. 
2013; Horvath et al. 2014; Fu et al. 2016), we employ a simultaneous equations model. We 
use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to empirically estimate the two 
equations. The GMM estimator is not only robust for the distribution of errors but is also 
more efficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity than instrumental variables (IV) 
estimators such as the two stages least square (2sls) and three stages least square (3sls). In the 
first equation (i.e., the liquidity creation equation), we regress a liquidity creation proxy on a 
bank capital ratio as well as a set of independent variables influencing liquidity creation. In 
the second equation (i.e., the capital equation), we regress our capital ratio on a liquidity 
creation proxy and a set of factors influencing bank capital. Therefore, our empirical model is 
based on the following baseline simultaneous equations system: 
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧%&'(&)&*+	-./0*&12&,* = 5 + 7-08&*09&,* +:;<12*.19	=0.&0>9/?&,* +:;	<12*.19	=0.&0>9/?@,* + /&,@,*A@=1C&=1
-08&*09&,* = 5 + 7%&'(&)&*+	-./0*&12&,* +:;<12*.19	=0.&0>9/?&,* +:;	<12*.19	=0.&0>9/?@,*A@=1C&=1 + /&,@,*
(1) 
																																																								
8 To identify potential outliers, we use both the leverage statistics (Belsley et al. 1980) and the Cook's distance 
analysis (Cook 1977, 1979). 
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where Liquidity Creation denotes the proxy used to measure liquidity creation, i.e., the 
inverse of the net stable funding ratio; Capital represents a ratio used to measure bank capital; 
d and β are vectors of coefficient estimates; the subscript i denotes the firm; j denotes the 
country; t is the time period and ei,j,t is the disturbance term. 
We test the endogeneity of all the regressors for both equations to identify the best 
instruments matrix.9 All the endogenous variables have been instrumented by their one-year 
or two-year lagged values.  
3.3. Definition of variables 
3.3.1. Liquidity creation indicator 
As previously stated, we use as proxy of liquidity creation an indicator related to the 
new liquidity requirements established in Basel III, i.e., the inverse of the net stable funding 
ratio. We therefore calculate our liquidity creation indicator as the amount of required stable 
funding (RSF) relative to the amount of available stable funding (ASF). RSF refers to the 
bank assets and off-balance sheet activities that are considered illiquid over a one-year time 
horizon and thus should be backed by stable funding resources, and ASF refers to the capital 
and liabilities expected to be stable over a one-year time horizon. RSF and ASF are calculated 
by assigning the carrying values of bank assets and liabilities to several categories and then 
weighting those amounts. The RSF weights range from 0 to 100 percent to reflect the 
liquidity of asset categories, with illiquid assets enjoining the higher RSF factors (all assets 
that are encumbered for a period of 1 year or more are assigned a 100 percent RSF weight). 
Similarly, the ASF weights range from 0 to 100 percent to reflect the stability of liability 
types, with a higher ASF weight meaning a more stable funding (regulatory capital). Higher 
values for the inverse of the net stable funding ratio mean that the amount of illiquid assets is 																																																								
9 We check endogeneity with the Durbin score and the Wu-Hausman tests. Both tests have as a null hypothesis 
that the variable under consideration can be used as exogenous. 
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increasing in relation to the available amount of stable funding, thus indicating a higher 
liquidity creation (as well as a greater liquidity risk). Table 2 shows the composition of asset 
and liability categories (and their weights) used to calculate our liquidity creation indicator 
according to the Bankscope database terminology. In Appendix 1, we also report a 
comparison of the original Basel III net stable funding ratio with our proxy.10 We consider 
only on-balance sheet positions because a detailed breakdown of off-balance sheet positions is 
not available for all the banks in our sample.11 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
3.3.2. Bank capital indicators 
We use three ratios commonly used in the literature as a measure of bank capital: the 
equity to total assets ratio (Equity), the total regulatory capital ratio (Total Capital) and the 
Tier 1 ratio (Tier 1). The equity to total assets ratio is the book value of equity divided by the 
book value of total assets. The total regulatory capital ratio is the total capital adequacy ratio 
under the Basel rules, including Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital as a percentage of RWA and off-
balance sheet risks. The Tier 1 ratio refers to shareholder funds plus perpetual non-cumulative 
preference shares as a percentage of the RWA and off-balance sheet risks. 
3.3.3. Control variables affecting liquidity creation 
In our liquidity creation equation, we also include a number of control variables, which 
the literature has identified as relevant for banks’ liquidity choices. We control for credit risk 
by using the non-performing loan ratio (Non-Performing). As stated by Berger and Bouwman 
(2009), it is important to control for risk because it helps to isolate the role of capital in 
																																																								
10 Although Bankscope does not give the required level of detail necessary to calculate the net stable funding 
ratio according to the BCBS (2014) guidelines for most of the banks in our sample, we can use this database to 
consistently approximate this ratio. Nevertheless, some assumptions are needed (Chiaramonte and Casu, 2017). 
11 Unfortunately, empirically testing the effect of off-balance sheet activities is hampered by the absence of 
detailed data in Bankscope. Although Bankscope gives information about off-balance sheet activities for some of 
the banks in our sample, considering only those banks would excessively reduce the sample size. 
	 15 
supporting the liquidity creation of banks from the role of capital in supporting banks’ 
function as risk transformers. The theoretical financial intermediation literature, as modeled 
by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), postulates that credit risk and liquidity 
risk should be positively correlated (Imbierowicz and Rauch 2014).12 This idea of a positive 
relationship	between credit and liquidity risk (i.e., both risks increase or decrease jointly) is 
also supported by recent studies that focus on the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (Acharya and 
Viswanathan 2011; He and Xiong 2012).13 
Several empirical studies have shown that bank size may affect liquidity creation. A 
positive relationship could be expected between bank size and liquidity creation as larger 
banks could create more liquidity than smaller banks because they have easier access to the 
lender of last resort and because they would be the first to benefit from the safety net 
(Distinguin et al. 2013). Nonetheless, Horváth et al. (2014) and Fu et al. (2016) observe a 
significantly negative coefficient of bank size on their liquidity creation equation, suggesting 
that smaller banks create more liquidity (per total assets) than larger ones. As usual in the 
literature, we measure bank size by the natural logarithm of total assets (Size). 
Market competition may have important effects on liquidity creation (Berger and 
Bouwman 2016; Horvath et al. 2016; Jiang et al. 2016). However, those effects are still 
ambiguous. The structure-conduct-performance hypothesis (Bain 1959) states that increased 
competition (or, alternatively, lower market power) induces banks to offer more favorable 
pricing to customers, resulting in higher liquidity creation. In support of this view, some 
empirical studies find that increased competition improves bank lending (Cetorelli and 
Strahan 2006; Canales and Nanda 2012). Conversely, some of the relationship banking 
literature argues that increased competition may reduce bank lending (Petersen and Rajan 																																																								
12 Liquidity creation is positively associated with liquidity risk and may be positively associated with credit risk 
if the high liquidity creation is caused by high business loans and commitments (Berger and Bouwman 2016). 
13 Nevertheless, a recent body of literature suggests the possibility that the relationship between liquidity risk and 
credit risk in banks might be negative (see e.g., Wagner 2007; Gatev et al. 2009; Acharya and Naqvi 2012). 
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1995). In addition, the “fragility channel” view states that bank competition should lead to a 
contraction in liquidity creation, as increased competition reduces bank profits and thus 
incentivizes banks to reduce their lending and deposit activities to diminish the threat of bank 
runs (Horvath et al. 2016). Recent works by Horvath et al. (2016), on a dataset of Czech 
banks from 2002 to 2010, and Jiang et al. (2016), on a sample of US commercial banks from 
1984 to 2006, conclude that increased competition reduces liquidity creation. We use the 
number of bank branches per 10,000 inhabitants (Competition) as a proxy for market 
competition, which reflects structural differences in banking markets.  
The macroeconomic environment is also likely to affect bank liquidity creation. 
Therefore, we add the annual growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP) and the 
unemployment rate of the country (Unemployment) to our equation. We may expect that 
during economic booms, with higher rates of economic growth and lower unemployment 
rates, banks increase liquidity creation (Distinguin et al. 2013). We also incorporate the 
interest rate of the main refinancing operations of the ECB (Interest). This provides the bulk 
of the liquidity to the European banking system as monetary policy may influence liquidity 
creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2017). 
Finally, we control for the public status of the bank (Listed) and the bank type 
(Commercial Banks; Savings Banks), as they may affect liquidity creation (Berger and 
Bowman 2009; Fu et al. 2016). 
3.3.4. Control variables affecting bank capital 
Similarly, we control for a set of bank-specific, regulation and macroeconomic variables 
that are likely to influence bank capital. The literature (see, e.g., Berger et al. 1995; Flannery 
and Rangan 2008) reports a positive relationship between the risk of bank assets and capital, 
as banks increase their capital buffers to protect them against unexpected losses. Nevertheless, 
a negative relationship between risk and capital could be expected, as we proxy the risk 
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profile of the bank by the non-performing loans ratio (Non-Performing), which is an ex-post 
measure of risk, and loan losses could reduce bank capital (Ayuso et al. 2004).  
Controlling for bank size (Size) is also important, as larger banks may benefit from 
greater diversification, which reduces their risk exposure and thus their capital needs (Hughes 
et al. 2001; Altunbas et al. 2007). Additionally, larger banks may also be viewed as more 
likely to be “too-big-to-fail” and thus require less capital (Brewer III et al. 2008).14 
Consequently, the expected sign for the coefficient of this variable in the capital equation is 
negative. 
We include the return on equity (ROE) in our capital equation, as several studies 
indicate that profitability may positively influence bank capital (Flannery and Rangan 2008; 
Gropp and Heider 2010). In line with the pecking-order-theory of the capital structure, capital 
accumulation could rely on funds generated internally (e.g., through higher retained earnings) 
because raising capital is usually more expensive. 
We control for the funding structure of banks by adding the ratio of non-deposit funds 
to total liabilities (Non-Deposits). Nier and Bauman (2006) suggest that as uninsured 
liabilities are likely to face large losses in case of bank failure, stronger market discipline 
exercised by uninsured debtholders results in larger capital buffers. Therefore, we may expect 
a positive sign for this variable in our empirical specification.	 
Following Distinguin et al. (2013), because banks are likely to increase their capital 
holdings under stronger regulations, we include an indicator of the level of stringency of 
capital regulation extracted from the World Bank database on Bank Regulation and 
																																																								
14 In response to the 2007 financial crisis, the BCBS imposes global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) 
additional loss absorbency requirements, which range from 1% to 2.5% CET1, depending on a bank's systemic 
importance.  
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Supervision developed by Barth et al. (2001) (Stringency Index).15,16 Because regulatory 
initiatives are unlikely to affect the behavior of banks in the immediate term, we use the first 
lag of the corresponding index (Baselga-Pascual et al. 2015).  
Bank capital also depends on macroeconomic conditions. Capital ratios may be 
procyclical if banks use an expansionary macroeconomic environment to accumulate capital 
(Laeven and Majnoni 2003; Schaeck and Cihák 2012). Moreover, during recessions, defaults 
on bank loans increase and generate higher losses that are charged against bank capital 
(Brewer III et al. 2008). We therefore expect a positive relationship between bank capital and 
GDP and a negative relationship between bank capital and unemployment rate 
(Unemployment). Nonetheless, Ayuso et al. (2004) find that capital buffers were counter-
cyclical in Spain over the period 1986–2000. They conclude that the negative relationship that 
they find between capital buffers and the business cycle offers some support to the view that 
certain institutions may behave in an excessively lax manner during upturns because they (or 
the risk models they use) do not take properly into account the cyclical nature of output and 
therefore tend to underestimate risks during economic upturns. The level of interest rates 
																																																								
15 The capital stringency index is built by adding two measures of capital stringency: overall and initial capital 
stringency. Overall capital stringency indicates whether risk elements and value losses are considered while 
calculating the regulatory capital. It is based on the following questions: (i) Is the minimum capital–asset ratio 
requirement risk weighted in line with the Basel guidelines? (ii) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of 
credit risk? (iii) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? (iv) Are market values of loan losses 
not realized in accounting books deducted from capital? (v) Are unrealized losses in securities portfolios 
deducted from capital? (vi) Are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted from capital? (vii) What fraction of 
revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? Initial capital stringency refers to whether certain funds may be 
used to initially capitalize a bank and whether they are officially verified. It is based on the following questions: 
(viii) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory or supervisory authorities? (ix) Can 
the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be performed with assets other than cash or 
government securities? (x) Can the initial disbursement of capital be performed with borrowed funds? We assign 
a value of 1 if the answer to questions (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) and (viii) is yes, and 0 otherwise, while the 
opposite holds in the case of questions (ix) and (x). In addition, we assign a value of 1 if the fraction of 
revaluation gains that is allowed to count as regulatory capital (question (vii)) is less than 0.75. Otherwise, we 
assign a value of 0. By adding all these values together, we create the variable capital stringency index, which 
ranges in value from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater stringency. 
16 This database is based on four surveys conducted by the World Bank. Survey I was released in 2001, and, for 
most of the countries, the information corresponds to 1999. Survey II describes the regulatory situation at the 
end of 2002. Survey III describes the regulatory environment in 2005–2006. Finally, Survey IV provides 
information on bank regulation and supervision in 125 countries for 2011 (with some corrections in 2012) (Barth 
et al. 2013). This database is available from the World Bank website at http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978P0. 
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(Interest) may also affect capital ratios (see, e.g., Altunbas et al. 2007; Schaeck and Cihák 
2012) although the expected sign for the coefficient of this variable is ambiguous. Higher 
interest rates can provide banks with greater profits and thus higher capital, yet rising interest 
rates may negatively affect capital ratios, as it may imply more loan defaults. 
Finally, as in the bank liquidity equation, we control for the public status of the bank 
(Listed) and the bank type (Commercial Banks; Savings Banks), as they may also affect 
capital holdings. 
Table 3 summarizes the variables considered in the current study. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the variables considered in this paper. Although 
we drop those entities with abnormal ratios from the sample in a first step, the maximum and 
minimum values seem to still reflect the presence of some outliers in Liquidity Creation, Tier 
1 and ROE. We identify those outliers and estimate our models with and without outliers to 
avoid possible bias in the regressions. The results in both cases are very similar, probably 
because the GMM estimator - due to the lags used to manage endogeneity problems - 
excludes most of those extreme values.  
Table 5 shows the evolution of mean values for Liquidity Creation and Equity from 
1999 to 2013.17 We observe a clear tendency of both variables. Liquidity Creation decreases 
slowly, with the only exception being for 2004. Conversely, we observe a slight increase over 
time of the capital ratio, Equity. The results are similar when the sample is divided by type 
and size of banks. 																																																								
17 We find similar results when Total Capital and Tier 1 are used as the measure of bank capital. 
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[INSERT TABLES 4 & 5 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2. The relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital in the Eurozone 
Table 6 shows the regression results. We find an inverse relationship between capital 
ratios (i.e., Equity, Total Capital and Tier 1) and our liquidity creation proxy. Therefore, 
banks may reduce liquidity creation as bank capital increases, as suggested by the “financial-
fragility-crowding out” hypothesis. This result is consistent with the findings of Distinguin et 
al. (2013), Horvath et al. (2014) and Fu et al. (2016).  
Regarding the control variables affecting liquidity creation, we observe a positive 
relationship between credit risk and liquidity creation, suggesting that banks with a higher 
credit risk create more liquidity.18 The influence of size on liquidity creation is positive, 
similar to that reported by Distinguin et al. (2013). Market competition is negatively 
associated with liquidity creation, in line with the relationship banking literature (Petersen and 
Rajan 1995) and the “fragility channel” view (Horvath et al. 2016). We also find that the 
macroeconomic environment affects bank liquidity creation. During crisis periods, with low 
rates of economic growth and high unemployment rates, banks reduce liquidity creation. The 
effect of interest rates on liquidity creation is negative, suggesting that increased interest rates 
negatively affect liquidity creation. Finally, similar to Fu et al. (2016), the coefficient of 
Listed is negative, indicating that listed banks create less liquidity than non-listed banks. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
We also report an inverse relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital. As 
suggested by the “liquidity substitution” hypothesis, when banks face higher illiquidity, they 
may consider certain liquid liabilities as stable funding sources and thus substitute capital 
with these ‘stable’ liabilities. Again, our results are similar to those obtained by Distinguin et 																																																								
18 Berger and Bouwman (2016) state that there is little research to date on this topic, suggesting that examining 
this relationship would be a promising line of future research. 
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al. (2013), Horvath et al. (2014) and Fu et al. (2016), indicating that banks reduce capital 
when liquidity creation increases (or, alternatively, showing that banks do not strengthen their 
capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity, as defined in the Basel III capital accords). 
Most of the control variables have the expected sign in the regression. We report a significant 
negative relationship between risk and Equity. As Non-Performing is an ex post measurement 
of the risk-taking by banks, loan losses could reduce bank capital (Ayuso et al. 2004). Size has 
a significant negative sign, suggesting that larger banks may be viewed as more likely to be 
“too-big-to-fail” and thus require less capital (Brewer III et al. 2008). Profitability may 
positively influence bank capital as suggested by the positive sign of the ROE coefficient 
(though not in all of the regressions). We also find that a higher proportion of non-deposits in 
total liabilities may imply more capital. The significant positive sign for Stringency Index in 
the Equity regression would indicate that banks increase their capital holdings under stronger 
regulations. Bank capital also depends on macroeconomic conditions. Our results support the 
view that capital ratios were counter-cyclical, thus indicating that some institutions may 
behave in an excessively lax manner during upturns because they (or the risk models they 
use) do not take properly into account the cyclical nature of output and therefore tend to 
underestimate risks during economic upturns (Ayuso et al. 2004). Higher interest rates seem 
to negatively affect capital ratios, as they may imply more loan defaults. Finally, the 
coefficient of Listed is not significant. 
4.3. Robustness checks 
We conduct several robustness checks to confirm the aforementioned findings. 
4.3.1. Considering alternative liquidity creation proxies 
We construct two alternative liquidity creation proxies, LC (cat non-fat) and LC (mat 
non-fat), based on the “cat non-fat” and “mat non-fat” indicators of Berger and Bouwman 
(2009). To this end, we first classify all bank assets, liabilities and equity as liquid, semiliquid 
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or illiquid according to their category (“cat”) or their maturity (“mat”) (see Table 7).19,20 We 
then assign weights to those groups considering that maximum liquidity is created when 
liquid liabilities are transformed into illiquid assets and maximum liquidity is destroyed when 
illiquid liabilities or equity are transformed into liquid assets. Finally, we combine the groups 
and weights as suggested by Berger and Bouwman (2009) and divide this by the total assets. 
As in our baseline indicator of liquidity creation, we exclude off-balance sheet activities from 
LC (cat non-fat) and LC (mat non-fat). 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
The main difference between these two new liquidity creation indicators and our main 
liquidity indicator stems from the liability side of the balance sheets. Berger and Bouwman 
(2009) consider some liabilities as liquid because they can be quickly withdrawn without 
penalty. However, a large share of these liquid liabilities is considered as stable in the Basel 
III liquidity indicator because they are expected to ‘‘stay’’ within the institution (for example, 
customer deposits) (Distinguin et al. 2013). 
The results obtained do not differ substantially from those obtained previously; we find 
a negative and significant two-way relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital 
(see Table 8). Additionally, most of the control variables retain both their signs and their 
statistical significance, except that Size now shows a statistically significant negative 
relationship with liquidity creation. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
																																																								
19 For details about the correspondence of the “cat non-fat” and “mat non-fat” metrics of Berger and Bouwman 
(2009) with our liquidity creation indicators, LC (cat non-fat) and LC (mat non-fat), see Appendix 2. 
20 Unfortunately, the number of observations is drastically reduced from 7,275 to 2,396 when LC (cat non-fat) is 
used as the liquidity creation proxy. This reduction is mainly because Bankscope does not provide detailed date 
about loan categorization (e.g., corporate and commercial loans) for all the banks in our sample. Similarly, when 
we use LC (mat non-fat) as the liquidity creation indicator, the number of observations drops to 2,176. Now, this 
decrease in the number of observations is mainly due to the absence of exhaustive data on loan maturity (e.g., 
loans and advances to costumers less than or equal to 12 months). 
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Finally, following Berger and Bouwman (2009), we construct another indicator by 
excluding equity from our proxy of liquidity creation. This idea is based on theories that 
argue that banks create liquidity when illiquid assets are transformed into liquid liabilities but 
not when they are transformed into illiquid claims, such as equity. Moreover, as equity is 
included in both the liquidity creation indicator and the capital ratio, this may bias the results. 
Nevertheless, our findings (not reported) do not change our main conclusions, as most of the 
coefficients (both signs and statistical significances) are not affected. 
4.3.2. Excluding banks with capital ratios below minimum requirements 
We check the robustness of our results by excluding banks with regulatory capital ratios 
below the minimum requirements (i.e., 8% for the total regulatory capital ratio and 4% for the 
Tier 1 ratio). We also exclude observations that show equity to total assets ratios of less than 
2%. In all cases, the results are consistent with those previously obtained (see Table 9). 
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
4.3.3. Commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks 
As a third robustness check, we test whether our results differ between commercial 
banks, savings bank and cooperative banks. When we divide the sample by bank type, we 
find that savings banks seem to have a different behavior to the other types banks. Table 10 
shows that, in the case of savings banks, higher capital increases liquidity creation, as stated 
by the “risk absorption” theory. For these types of banks, the “risk absorption” capacity of 
equity capital is an important driver to explain liquidity creation. Moreover, we report that 
savings banks strengthen their capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity (i.e., they 
behave in the manner suggested by the “liquidity risk” hypothesis). This could be explained 
by the different ability of savings banks to raise external finance and their higher reliance on 
retained earnings.  
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[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
4.3.4. Smaller versus larger banks 
We now divide our sample according to the bank size (based on median total assets) to 
examine whether the relationship between capital and liquidity creation differs between small 
and large banks. Berger and Bouwman (2009) argue that the causal link that goes from bank 
capital to liquidity creation depends on size. They expect that the effects of the “financial 
fragility-crowding out” theory are likely to be relatively stronger for smaller banks.21 Their 
empirical results corroborate this idea, finding that the negative effect from capital on 
liquidity creation is present only for small banks (being positive for large banks). Distinguin 
et al. (2013) state that the differences in accessing external funding is likely to affect the link 
that goes from bank illiquidity to capital. However, they do not report differences between 
large and small European banks, the coefficients of the liquidity creation indicators not being 
conclusive in both regressions.  
Regarding our findings, Table 11 shows that they do not change substantially from 
those obtained for the baseline models, as most of the variables retain their original sign. We 
only appreciate that the negative link that goes from bank capital to liquidity creation seems 
to be stronger in the case of smaller banks, this result being consistent with that reported by 
Berger and Bouwman (2009).  
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
4.3.5. Pre-crisis (1999-2007) versus crisis (2008-2013) period 
As a new analysis, we divide the sample into two periods: a pre-crisis and relatively 
economically stable period (1999 to 2007) and a crisis period (2008 to 2013). We use this 																																																								
21 The close monitoring highlighted by Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) may be more important in smaller 
banks, which deal more with entrepreneurial-type small businesses (Distinguin et al. 2013). Additionally, the 
“crowding out” effect is more likely to affect smaller banks as they tend to be more funded by deposits than 
larger banks. 
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approach to examine possible differences in our regression due to the impact of both the 2008 
financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis that started in 2011 in the Eurozone. Table 12 
shows that although the results obtained using this approach resemble those of our baseline 
models, the significance of the explanatory variables is substantially stronger during the crisis 
period. Therefore, requiring banks to operate with higher capital, particularly in crisis periods, 
could weaken economic recovery. The establishment of the Basel III capital conservation 
buffer, which seeks to ensure that banks build up capital buffers outside periods of stress, 
would be an adequate solution to this problem.   
[INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
4.3.6. Considering alternative control variables 
We also re-estimate our equations by changing some of the control variables (see Table 
13). First, we replace the macroeconomic and regulatory variables with time and country 
dummies. As expected, our findings do not change substantially from those obtained for the 
baseline models. Second, we consider the Herfindahl–Hirschman index of industry 
concentration (Concentration) instead of Competition as a competition measure.22 Using this 
metric, the results are similar to those obtained for the initial models. Finally, because credit 
risk seems to be an important variable affecting both liquidity creation and capital, we replace 
Non-Performing with the ratio of RWA and off-balance sheet activities divided by total assets 
(RWATA). Once again, our results do not change substantially, as most of the coefficients 
(both signs and statistical significances) are not affected. As could be expected, the sign of the 
coefficient for the credit risk proxy in the capital equation is now positive. 
																																																								
22Concentration is calculated as the sum of the squares of all credit institutions’ market shares within a country 
in terms of total assets (in percentage). It is often said that a market is highly concentrated when the index 
exceeds 1800 (or 0.18, if we use units instead of percentages) and is unconcentrated when the index is below 
1000 (or 0.1). Therefore, a higher value for Concentration would correspond to a lower market competition. The 
data on Concentration in the euro area countries were obtained from the Banking Structural Financial Indicators 
database of the ECB at http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=bbn2869. 
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[INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE] 
4.3.7. Excluding Italy and Germany 
We test whether our results are similar when Italy and Germany (i.e., the countries with 
a larger number of observations) are excluded from the sample. Again, our findings do not 
change substantially from those obtained for the baseline equation (see Table 14). 
[INSERT TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE] 
4.3.8. Extending the analysis to all EU, EEA and EFTA countries 
As a final robustness check, we apply our empirical model to an extended sample that 
includes commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks from all the 28 EU member 
countries, plus Norway and Switzerland (see Table 15).23 Our results remain stable, with most 
of the coefficients (both signs and statistical significances) not being affected. We thus 
confirm that the existence of an inverse bi-causal relationship between capital and liquidity 
creation is a generally valid hypothesis, not Eurozone specific. 
[INSERT TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE] 
5. Conclusions 
This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between liquidity creation (or 
alternatively, illiquidity) and bank capital in the Eurozone. We consider a liquidity creation 
indicator in line with the new liquidity requirements established in Basel III (the inverse of 
the net stable funding ratio), one of the Basel Committee’s key reforms to promote a more 
resilient banking sector. Our sample comprises an unbalanced panel data set of 7,275 
observations from 1999 to 2013, which allows us to consider the impact of the financial and 
																																																								
23 We added to the original sample (17 Eurozone countries over the period 1999-2013) observations from 
Bulgaria (65), Croatia (117), the Czech Republic (65), Denmark (92), Hungary (43), Latvia (9), Lithuania (14), 
Norway (222), Poland (80), Romania (66), Sweden (32), Switzerland (685) and the United Kingdom (204). The 
extended sample includes banks from 30 EU, EEA and EFTA countries. 
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economic crisis on the Eurozone banking system. As previous studies suggest that liquidity 
and capital could be jointly determined, we employ a simultaneous equations model. 
We find a significant and inverse bi-causal relationship between capital and liquidity 
creation. This empirical result is consistent with the findings of Distinguin et al. (2013) 
(European and US listed commercial banks over the period 2000-2006), Horvath et al. (2014) 
(Czech banks over the period 2000-2010) and Fu et al. (2016) (Asia-Pacific commercial 
banks over the period 2005-2012). Therefore, our results indicate that banks may reduce 
liquidity creation as they increase capital, as stated by the “financial-fragility-crowding out” 
hypothesis. This suggests that a fragile capital structure can encourage banks to maximize 
liquidity creation (Diamond and Rajan 2000, 2001), whereas higher capital ratios limit 
liquidity creation by reducing bank deposits (Gorton and Wilton 2000). Our results also 
support the “liquidity substitution” hypothesis, which suggests that as liquidity creation 
increases, banks may consider certain liquid liabilities as stable funding sources, reducing 
bank capital. Alternatively, this negative relationship in the causal link that goes from 
liquidity to capital suggests that banks do not strengthen their capital ratios when they face 
higher illiquidity, as defined in the Basel capital accords. 
Our findings have important policy implications and could have broader significance 
for supervisors concerned about benchmarking and validation issues related to banking 
regulation. They reinforce the idea of establishing minimum liquidity ratios in coordination 
with capital ratios, as both are closely related to each other. Although the establishment of 
new liquidity requirements could strengthen bank solvency, the higher capital requirements 
together with the need to comply with the new liquidity ratios recently established in Basel III 
(and the subsequent EU regulation) may limit the amount of bank funding available to firms 
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Appendix 1. Correspondence of Basel III net stable funding ratio with our liquidity creation proxy 
 
Available Stable Funding (ASF) (BCBS, 2014) Weight Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
terminology 
Total regulatory capital (excluding Tier 2 instruments with residual maturity of less than 1 year) + Other capital instruments and liabilities (including 
term deposits) with effective residual maturity of 1 year or more 
100% Total equity + Total long-term funding 
Stable non-maturity (demand) deposits and term deposits with residual maturity of less than 1 year provided by retail and small business customers 95% Customer deposits (current) + Customer deposits 
(savings) + Customer deposits (term) 
Less stable non-maturity deposits and term deposits with residual maturity of less than 1 year provided by retail and small business customers (e.g., 
Internet deposits) 
90% Not available 
Funding with residual maturity of less than 1 year provided by non-financial corporate customers + Operational deposits + Funding with residual 
maturity of less than 1 year from sovereigns, public sector entities (PSEs) and multilateral and national development banks + Other funding with 
residual maturity between 6 months and less than 1 year not included in the above categories, including funding provided by central banks and 
financial institutions 
50% Other deposits and short-term borrowings 
All other liabilities and equity not included in the above categories, including liabilities without a stated maturity (with a specific treatment for deferred 
tax liabilities and minority interests) + derivative liabilities net of derivative assets if derivative liabilities are greater than derivative assets + “Trade 
date” payables arising from purchases of financial instruments, foreign currencies and commodities 
0% Deposits from banks + Repos and cash collateral 
+ Derivatives + Trading liabilities + Other 
liabilities (tax, pension, insurance) 
Required Stable Funding (RSF) (BCBS, 2014)   
Coins and banknotes + All central bank reserves + All claims on central banks with residual maturities of less than 6 months + “Trade date” 
receivables arising from sales of financial instruments, foreign currencies and commodities 
0% Cash and due from banks 
Unencumbered Level 1 assets, excluding coins, banknotes and central bank reserves 5% Memo: Government securities included above 
Unencumbered loans to financial institutions with residual maturities of less than 6 months, where the loan is secured against Level 1 assets, and where 
the bank has the ability to freely rehypothecate the received collateral for the life of the loan 
10% Not available 
All other unencumbered loans to financial institutions with residual maturities of less than 6 months not included in the above categories + 
Unencumbered Level 2A assets 
15% Not available 
Unencumbered Level 2B assets + High-quality liquid assets (HQLA) encumbered for a period of 6 months or more and less than 1 year + Loans to 
financial institutions subject to prudential supervision with residual maturities between 6 months and less than 1 year + Deposits held at other financial 
institutions for operational purposes + All other assets not included in the above categories with residual maturity of less than 1 year, including loans to 
non-financial corporate clients, loans to retail and small business customers, and loans to sovereigns and PSEs 
50% Total securities - Memo: Government securities 
included above - At-equity investments in 
associates + Loans and advances to banks 
Unencumbered residential mortgages with a residual maturity of 1 year or more and with a risk weight of less than or equal to 35% under the 
Standardized Approach + Other unencumbered loans not included in the above categories, excluding loans to financial institutions, with a residual 
maturity of one year or more and with a risk weight of less than or equal to 35% under the Standardized Approach 
65% Residential mortgage loans 
Cash, securities or other assets posted as initial margin for derivative contracts and cash or other assets provided to contribute to the default fund of a 
central counterparty (CCP) + Other unencumbered performing loans with risk weights greater than 35% under the Standardized Approach and residual 
maturities of 1 year or more, excluding loans to financial institutions  + Unencumbered securities that are not in default and do not qualify as HQLA 
including exchange-traded equities + Physical traded commodities, including gold 
85% Net loans - Residential mortgage loans 
All assets that are encumbered for a period of 1 year or more + derivative assets net of derivative liabilities if derivative assets are greater than 
derivative liabilities + All other assets not included in the above categories, including non-performing loans, loans to financial institutions with a 
residual maturity of one year or more, non-exchange-traded equities, fixed assets, pension assets, intangibles, deferred tax assets, retained interest, 
insurance assets, subsidiary interests, and defaulted securities 
100% Reserves for impaired loans/Non-performing 
loans + Non-earning assets (excluding cash and 
due from banks) + Other earning assets + 
Insurance assets + Investments in property + At-
equity investments in associates 
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Appendix 2. Correspondence of Berger and Bouwman (2009)’s indicators with our alternative liquidity creation indicators 
 
Assets (by category = “cat”) Weight Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) terminology  
Illiquid assets = Commercial real estate loans (CRE) + Loans to finance agricultural 
production + Commercial and industrial loans (C&I) + Other loans and lease financing 
receivables 
50% Corporate & commercial loans + Reserves for impaired loans/Non-performing loans + 
Non-earning assets (excluding cash and due from banks) + Other earning assets + 
Insurance assets + Investments in property + At-equity investments in associates 
Semiliquid assets = Residential real estate loans (RRE) + Consumer loans + Loans to 
depository institutions + Loans to state and local governments + Loans to foreign 
governments 
0% Net loans – Corporate & commercial loans + Loans and advances to banks 
Liquid assets = Cash and due from other institutions + All securities (regardless of maturity) 
+ Trading assets + Fed funds sold 
-50% Cash and due from banks + Total securities - At-equity investments in associates 
Assets (by maturity = “mat”)   
Illiquid assets = All loans and leases with a remaining maturity of more than 1 year 50% Net loans – Loans & advances to customers < 3 months – Loans & advances to 
customers 3-12 months – Loans & advances to banks < 3 months – Loans & advances 
to banks 3-12 months + Reserves for impaired loans/Non-performing loans + Non-
earning assets (excluding cash and due from banks) + Other earning assets + 
Insurance assets  + Investments in property  + At-equity investments in associates 
Semiliquid assets = All loans and leases with a remaining maturity of 1 year or less 0% Loans & advances to customers < 3 months + Loans & advances to customers 3-12 
months + Loans & advances to banks < 3 months + Loans & advances to banks 3-12 
months 
Liquid assets = Cash and due from other institutions + All securities (regardless of maturity) 
+ Trading assets + Fed funds sold 
-50% Cash and due from banks + Total securities – At-equity investments in associates 
Liabilities + Equity   
Liquid liabilities = Transactions deposits + Savings deposits + Overnight federal funds 
purchased + Trading liabilities 
50% Customer deposits (current) + Customer deposits (savings) + Deposits from banks + 
Repos and cash collateral + Derivatives + Trading liabilities 
Semiliquid liabilities = Time deposits + Other borrowed money 0% Customer deposits (term) + Other deposits and short-term borrowings + Total long-
term funding – Subordinated borrowing 
Illiquid liabilities + Equity = Bank’s liability on bankers acceptances + Subordinated debt + 
Other liabilities + Equity 




Table 1. Banks and observations in the sample by country 
 
 
Country Banks Observations 
Austria 12 79 
Belgium 8 59 
Cyprus 11 44 
Estonia 2 9 
Finland 9 39 
France 139 700 
Germany 554 2,270 
Greece 6 47 
Ireland 4 30 
Italy 526 3,449 
Luxembourg 5 32 
Malta 2 10 
Netherlands 12 77 
Portugal 17 97 
Slovakia 8 39 
Slovenia 16 87 
Spain 36 207 
Total Eurozone 1,367 7,275 
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Table 2. Categories and weights used to calculate our liquidity creation proxy 
 
Available Stable Funding (ASF) Weights 
Total equity  
Total long-term funding 
Customer deposits (current) 
Customer deposits (savings) 
Customer deposits (term) 
Other deposits and short-term borrowings 
Deposits from banks  
Repos and cash collateral 
Derivatives 
Trading liabilities  












Required Stable Funding (RSF) Weights 
Cash and due from banks  
Memo: Government securities included above 
Total securities – [Memo: Government securities included above] – [At-equity investments in associates] 
Loans and advances to banks 
Residential mortgage loans 
Net loans – [Residential mortgage loans] 
Reserves for impaired loans/Non-performing loans  
Non-earning assets (excluding cash and due from banks) 
Other earning assets  
Insurance assets  
Investments in property  













Notes: We calculate our liquidity creation proxy (Liquidity Creation) as the inverse of the net stable funding ratio, i.e., as the amount 
of required stable funding (RSF) relative to the amount of available stable funding (ASF). For further details about the weighting of 
bank balance sheet items to compute this ratio, see Appendix 1. 
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Table 3. Variable definition  
Variable Definition Source 
Liquidity creation measures 
Liquidity Creation Measure of liquidity creation based on the inverse of the net 
stable funding ratio (Basel III) 
Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
LC (cat non-fat) Measure of liquidity creation based on “cat non-fat” metric by 
Berger and Bouwman (2009). The measure classifies all 
activities other than loans by product category (cat) excluding 
off-balance sheet activities (non-fat) divided by total assets. 
Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
LC (mat non-fat) Measure of liquidity creation based on “mat non-fat” metric 
by Berger and Bouwman (2009). The measure classifies all 
activities other than loans by maturity (mat) excluding off-
balance sheet activities (non-fat) divided by total assets. 
Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Bank capital measures 
Equity Equity divided by total assets (%) Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Total Capital Total capital adequacy ratio estimated according to Basel III 
rules. It measures Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital, which includes 
subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves and the 
valuation reserves as a percentage of RWA and off-balance 
sheet risks (%) 
Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Tier 1 Shareholder funds plus perpetual non-cumulative preference 
shares as a percentage of RWA and off-balance sheet risks 
measured under Basel III rules (%) 
Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Bank-specific variables 
Non-Performing Non-performing loans divided by gross loans (%)  Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
RWATA Basel II risk weighted assets and off-balance sheet activities 
divided by total assets (%) 
Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Size Total assets (in logarithmic form)  Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
ROE Return on equity (%)  Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Non-Deposit Non-deposit funds divided by total liabilities (%)  Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Listed Dummy variable. It takes value 1 for listed banks, and 0 
otherwise 
 
Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Commercial Banks Dummy variable. It takes value 1 for commercial banks, and 0 
otherwise 
Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Savings Banks Dummy variable. It takes value 1 for savings banks, and 0 
otherwise 
Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Country-specific variables 
Competition Proxy of market competition. Number of bank branches per 
10,000 inhabitants 
Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Concentration Herfindahl–Hirschman index of industry concentration Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Stringency Index The capital stringency index is built by adding two measures 
of capital stringency: overall and initial capital stringency. 
Overall capital stringency indicates whether risk elements and 
value losses are considered while calculating the regulatory 
capital. Initial capital stringency refers to whether certain 
funds may be used to initially capitalize a bank and whether 
they are officially verified. It ranges in value from 0 to 10, 
with higher values indicating greater stringency 
World Bank 
GDP Annual real GDP growth rate (%) World Bank 
Unemployment Unemployment rate (%) World Bank 
Interest Interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the ECB 
(%) 
ECB 
   
Note: This table defines the variables used in the study and the source of the data. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Median Maximum 
Liquidity Creation  7,275 0.89 0.33 0.06 0.83 6.3 
Equity 7,275 8.51 3.81 0.02 8.56 58.73 
Total Capital 7,275 16.6 10.47 0.1 15.1 417.1 
Tier 1 7,275 14.08 9.96 0.09 12.5 393 
Non-Performing  7,275 6.71 5.82 0 5.06 92.79 
ROE 7,275 3.46 18.92 -832.9 3.99 83.59 
Size 7,275 14.06 2.17 9.54 13.55 21.51 
Competition 7,275 5.44 1.38 1.06 5.32 14.88 
Non-Deposit 7,275 34.91 19.17 0 35.13 99.99 
GDP 7,275 0.05 2.26 -8.86 0.38 8.26 
Unemployment 7,275 7.87 3.05 3 7.1 27.3 
Interest 7,275 1.3 1.13 0.25 1 4.75 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for the entire sample from 1999 to 2013. The sample includes 1,367 banks from 
the following Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 





Table 5. Evolution of liquidity creation and bank capital in the Eurozone (1999-2013) 
 














1999 1.115 6.054 1.193 11.185 0.966 5.214 1.012 4.631 1.139 6.977 1.104 4.840 
2000 1.074 6.235 1.074 11.147 1.013 5.504 1.129 4.784 1.386 7.221 0.968 4.981 
2001 1.261 6.405 1.362 11.119 1.086 5.794 1.016 4.951 1.116 7.622 1.307 4.983 
2002 0.976 6.709 1.007 11.164 1.026 6.010 0.682 5.251 1.062 8.030 0.956 5.329 
2003 0.907 6.853 0.930 11.211 0.968 5.989 0.679 5.456 0.988 8.142 0.879 5.562 
2004 1.124 7.067 1.107 11.145 1.292 6.220 0.904 5.695 1.151 8.278 1.119 5.979 
2005 0.938 8.552 1.113 11.205 0.863 8.380 0.871 6.260 0.756 9.931 1.055 6.851 
2006 0.905 8.930 1.041 11.262 0.845 8.706 0.936 6.491 0.752 11.030 1.018 7.340 
2007 0.870 8.943 1.035 11.189 0.828 8.849 0.905 6.660 0.774 11.050 0.974 7.297 
2008 0.871 8.877 1.093 11.235 0.821 8.521 0.879 6.719 0.764 11.086 0.966 6.941 
2009 0.893 8.955 1.188 11.263 0.829 8.470 0.878 6.917 0.795 11.076 0.973 7.237 
2010 0.896 9.395 1.173 11.349 0.834 8.665 0.884 7.517 0.788 11.138 0.983 7.532 
2011 0.896 9.795 1.087 11.296 0.854 8.663 0.882 9.588 0.812 11.157 0.963 8.167 
2012 0.887 9.734 1.026 11.255 0.858 9.045 0.878 8.795 0.814 11.145 0.941 8.250 
2013 0.881 9.772 1.023 11.211 0.852 9.291 0.862 8.803 0.815 11.117 0.922 8.758 
All years 0.892 8.514 1.091 11.233 0.844 7.997 0.881 6.774 0.799 9.979 0.969 7.048 
Notes: This table shows the mean values for our liquidity creation indicator, i.e., the inverse of the net stable funding ratio, and the equity to total assets ratio (Equity) from 1999 to 2013. The sample includes 1,367 banks 
from the following Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. See Table 3 for a 











Notes: This table presents our main regression results estimated using a 
simultaneous equations model with a GMM estimator. The sample includes 1,367 
banks from the following Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. See Table 3 for a description 
of the variables. We report heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic standard errors 
in parentheses. Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as c2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
instruments and the error term. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * 



















(0.002)   
Total Capital  -0.002*** (0.000)  






































































































































No. of observations 7,275 7,275 7,275 




Table 7. Categories and weights used to calculate alternative liquidity creation proxies 
 
Assets by Category, excluding off-balance sheet activities (cat non-fat) Weights 
Illiquid assets 
Corporate & commercial loans  
Reserves for impaired loans/Non-performing loans  
Non-earning assets (excluding cash and due from banks) 
Other earning assets  
Insurance assets  
Investments in property  
At-equity investments in associates 
Semiliquid assets 
Net loans – [Corporate & commercial loans] 
Loans and advances to banks 
Liquid assets 
Cash and due from banks  















Assets by Maturity, excluding off-balance sheet activities (mat non-fat) Weights 
Illiquid assets 
Net loans – [Loans & advances to customers ≤ 12 months] – [Loans & advances to banks ≤ 12 months] 
Reserves for impaired loans/Non-performing loans 
Non-earning assets (excluding cash and due from banks) 
Other earning assets  
Insurance assets  
Investments in property  
At-equity investments in associates 
Semiliquid assets 
Loans & advances to customers < 3 months 
Loans & advances to customers 3-12 months 
Loans & advances to banks < 3 months 
Loans & advances to banks 3-12 months 
Liquid assets 
Cash and due from banks  

















Liabilities + Equity Weights 
Liquid liabilities 
Customer deposits (current) 
Customer deposits (savings)  
Deposits from banks  




Customer deposits (term) 
Other deposits and short-term borrowings 
Total long-term funding – [Subordinated borrowing] 
Illiquid liabilities plus equity 
Subordinated borrowing 
Total equity  
















Notes: Following Berger and Bowman (2009), we construct LC (cat non-fat) and LC (mat non-fat) combining bank balance sheet items 
as follows: + ½ x illiquid assets + 0 x semiliquid assets – ½ x liquid assets + ½ x liquid liabilities + 0 x semiliquid liabilities – ½ x 
(illiquid liabilities + equity). We then divide this result by total assets. The measures differ in that we alternatively classify loans by 
category (“cat”) or maturity (“mat). “non-fat” means that we exclude off-balance sheet activities. For further details about the weighting 




Table 8. Considering alternative liquidity creation proxies 
 
Notes: This table presents the regressions for alternative measures of liquidity creation using a simultaneous equations model with a GMM estimator. 
The sample includes banks from the following Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. We construct LC (cat non-fat) and LC (mat non-fat) following 
Berger and Bowman (2009). The measures differ in that we alternatively classify loans by category (“cat”) or maturity (“mat); “non-fat” means that 
we exclude off-balance sheet activities. See Table 7 for the categories and weights used to calculate LC (cat non-fat) and LC (mat non-fat). See Table 
3 for a description of the variables. We report heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Hansen is a test of the over-
identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as c2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term. 

































(0.005)   
-0.013*** 
(0.004)   
Total Capital  -0.000* (0.000)   
-0.001*** 
(0.000)  
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No. of observations 2,396 2,396 2,396 2,176 2,176 2,176 



















(0.002)   
Total Capital  -0.002*** (0.000)  
Tier 1   -0.002*** (0.000) 
 Equity Total Capital Tier 1 






No. of observations 7,226 6,558 6,428 
Hansen 7.893 8.238 7.578 
Notes: This table presents the regression results excluding observations with Equity less than 2% 
(model 1), Total Capital less than 8% (model 2), and Tier 1 less than 4% (model 3). We use a 
simultaneous equations model with a GMM estimator. The sample includes banks from the following 
Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. We include the 
following control variables (not reported): Non-Performing, Size, Competition, GDP, Unemployment, 
Interest, Listed, Commercial Banks and Savings Banks (in the liquidity creation equation); Non-
Performing, Size, ROE, Non-Deposits, Stringency Index, GDP, Unemployment, Interest, Listed, 
Commercial Banks and Savings Banks (in the bank capital equation). See Table 3 for a description of 
the variables. We report heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. 
Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 2 under the null 
hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term. Significance levels are 
indicated as follows: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at 






Table 10. Liquidity creation and capital by bank type 
 
 






























(0.004)   
0.009** 
(0.004)   
-0.005*** 
(0.001)   
Total Capital  -0.001* (0.000)   
0.003 
(0.364)   
-0.008*** 
(0.000)  
Tier 1   -0.001* (0.000)   
0.009** 
(0.002)   
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
 Equity Total Capital Tier 1 Equity Total Capital Tier 1 Equity Total Capital Tier1 


















No. of observations 1,583 1,583 1,583 1,165 1,165 1,165 4,527 4,527 4,527 
Hansen 2.440 5.553 3.710 2.181 2.850 4.084 5.453 5.807 5.786 
Notes: This table presents the regression results when the sample is divided by bank type. We use a simultaneous equations model with a GMM estimator. The sample includes 1,367 banks from the 
following Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. We 
include the following control variables (not reported): Non-Performing, Size, Competition, GDP, Unemployment, Interest and Listed (in the liquidity creation equation); Non-Performing, Size, ROE, Non-
Deposits, Stringency Index, GDP, Unemployment, Interest and Listed (in the bank capital equation). See Table 3 for a description of the variables. We report heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic 
standard errors in parentheses. Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as c2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term. 




Table 11. Liquidity creation and capital by bank size 
 
 





















(0.001)   
-0.005* 
(0.003)   
Total Capital  -0.008*** (0.000)   
-0.001* 
(0.000)  
Tier 1   -0.008*** (0.000)   
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 Equity Total Capital Tier 1 Equity 
Total 
Capital Tier 1 












No. of observations 3,637 3,637 3,637 3,638 3,638 3,638 
Hansen 5.441 5.401 5.301 3.623 3.49 1.633 
Notes: This table presents the regression results when the sample is divided by bank size (based on median total assets). We use a 
simultaneous equations model with a GMM estimator. The sample includes 1,367 banks from the following Eurozone countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. We include the following control variables (not reported): Non-Performing, Size, Competition, GDP, 
Unemployment, Interest, Listed, Commercial Banks and Savings Banks (in the liquidity creation equation); Non-Performing, Size, 
ROE, Non-Deposits, Stringency Index, GDP, Unemployment, Interest, Listed, Commercial Banks and Savings Banks (in the bank 
capital equation). See Table 3 for a description of the variables. We report heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic standard errors 
in parentheses. Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as c2 under the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between the instruments and the error term. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * Significant at the 10% level. 






Table 12. Liquidity creation and capital: pre-crisis versus crisis period 
 
 





















(0.011)   
-0.005*** 
(0.002)   
Total Capital  -0.002 (0.002)   
-0.002*** 
(0.000)  
Tier 1   -0.005* (0.003)   
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 Equity Total Capital Tier 1 Equity 
Total 
Capital Tier 1 












No. of observations 1,153 1,153 1,153 6,122 6,122 6,122 
Hansen 2.263 4.854 2.712 2.915 4.954 7.567 
Notes: This table presents the regression results when the sample is divided in two periods: pre-crisis (1999-2007) and crisis (2008-
2013). We use a simultaneous equations model with a GMM estimator. The sample includes 1,367 banks from the following 
Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. We include the following control variables (not reported): Non-Performing, 
Size, Competition, GDP, Unemployment, Interest, Listed, Commercial Banks and Savings Banks (in the liquidity creation equation); 
Non-Performing, Size, ROE, Non-Deposits, Stringency Index, GDP, Unemployment, Interest, Listed, Commercial Banks and 
Savings Banks (in the bank capital equation). See Table 3 for a description of the variables. We report heteroskedasticity-consistent 
asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as c2 
under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term. Significance levels are indicated as follows: 



















A) Including year and country dummies instead of macroeconomic variables 
 
Equity -0.004*** 
(0.002)   
Total Capital  -0.002*** (0.000)  
Tier 1   -0.002*** (0.000) 
 Equity Total Capital Tier 1 






No. of observations 7,275 7,275 7,275 
Hansen 3.019 3.850 2.094 
B) Including Concentration instead of Competition  
 
Equity -0.007*** 
(0.002)   
Total Capital  -0.002*** (0.000)  
Tier 1   -0.002*** (0.000) 





 Equity Total Capital Tier 1 






No. of observations 7,275 7,275 7,275 
Hansen 5.834 5.822 4.334 
C) Including RWATA instead of Non-Performing 
 
Equity -0.007*** 
(0.002)   
Total Capital  -0.002*** (0.000)  
Tier 1   -0.001*** (0.000) 





 Equity Total Capital Tier 1 











No. of observations 7,275 7,275 7,275 
Hansen 5.163 5.564 3.026 
Notes: This table presents the results for our baseline equations after changing some of the 
explanatory control variables. We use a simultaneous equations model with a GMM estimator. The 
sample includes 1,367 banks from the following Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, The Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. The models in section A) consider year and country 
dummies in place of macroeconomic variables. We also include the following control variables 
(not reported): Non-Performing, Size, Competition, Listed, Commercial Banks and Savings Banks 
(in the liquidity creation equation); Non-Performing, Size, ROE, Non-Deposits, Listed, Commercial 
Banks and Savings Banks (in the bank capital equation). The models in section B) consider 
Concentration in place of Competition. We also include the following control variables (not 
reported): Non-Performing, Size, GDP, Unemployment, Interest, Listed, Commercial Banks and 
Savings Banks (in the liquidity creation equation); Non-Performing, Size, ROE, Non-Deposits, 
Stringency Index, GDP, Unemployment, Interest, Listed, Commercial Banks and Savings Banks (in 
the bank capital equation).  The models in section C) consider RWATA in place of Non-Performing. 
We also include the following control variables (not reported): Size, Competition, GDP, 
Unemployment, Interest, Listed, Commercial Banks and Savings Banks (in the liquidity creation 
equation); Size, ROE, Non-Deposits, Stringency Index, GDP, Unemployment, Interest, Listed, 
Commercial Banks and Savings Banks (in the bank capital equation). See Table 3 for a description 
of the variables. We report heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. 
Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as c2 under the null 
hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term. Significance levels are 
indicated as follows: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant 
at the 1% level. 
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Table 14. Liquidity creation and capital: excluding Italy and Germany 
 
 






























(0.003)   
-0.211*** 
(0.046)   
-0.007* 
(0.004)   
Total Capital  -0.007*** (0.001)   
0.014 
(0.022)   
-0.001** 
(0.000)  
Tier 1   -0.007*** (0.002)   
0.024 
(0.027)   
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
 Equity Total Capital Tier 1 Equity Total Capital Tier 1 Equity Total Capital Tier 1 


















No. of observations 3,449 3,449 3,449 2,270 2,270 2,270 1,556 1,556 1,556 
Hansen 7.776 7.798 7.036 3.676 1.498 0.985 3.257 2.881 1.381 
Notes: This table presents the regression results when Italian (526) banks and German (554) banks are excluded from the original sample. The “Rest of the Eurozone” sample includes 287 banks from the 
following countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. We use a simultaneous equations 
model with a GMM estimator. We include the following control variables (not reported): Non-Performing, Size, Competition, GDP, Unemployment, Interest, Listed, Commercial Banks and Savings Banks 
(in the liquidity creation equation); Non-Performing, Size, ROE, Non-Deposits, Stringency Index, GDP, Unemployment, Interest, Listed, Commercial Banks and Savings Banks (in the bank capital equation). 
We only report the results obtained for the variables of interest. See Table 3 for a description of the variables. We report heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Hansen is a 
test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as c2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * 


















(0.002)   
Total Capital  -0.002*** (0.000)  
Tier 1   -0.002*** (0.000) 
 Equity Total Capital Tier 1 






No. of observations 8,969 8,969 8,969 
Hansen 4.791 3.816 4.881 
 Notes: This table presents the regression results when we apply our empirical model to a new sample 
that includes all the EU-28 countries, plus Norway and Switzerland. The extended sample includes 
8,969 bank/year observations from 17 Eurozone countries –Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain–; 11 EU (non-Eurozone) countries –Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom–; and 2 European (non-EU) countries –Switzerland and Norway. We use a simultaneous 
equations model with a GMM estimator. We include the following control variables (not reported): 
Non-Performing, Size, Listed, Commercial Banks, Savings Banks, country dummies and year 
dummies (in the liquidity creation equation); Non-Performing, Size, ROE, Non-Deposits, Stringency 
Index, Listed, Commercial Banks, Savings Banks, country dummies and year dummies (in the bank 
capital equation). See Table 3 for a description of the variables. We report heteroskedasticity-
consistent asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Hansen is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as c2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
instruments and the error term. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * Significant at the 10% 
level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
